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Abstract: 
 
One of the most pressing concerns about the industrialization of agriculture and food is the 
consolidation and concentration of markets for agricultural inputs, agricultural commodities food 
processing and groceries.   In essence a small minority of actors globally exercise great control 
over food system decisions.  This means that because of increased consolidation of these markets 
globally – from the United States to China to Brazil, from South Africa to the United Kingdom – 
the vast majority of farmers, consumers and communities are left out of key decisions about how 
we farm and what we eat.  Transnational agrifood firms are motivated by profits and power in 
the marketplace, leaving other social, economic and ecological goals behind.  This creates an 
agroecological crisis in the face of climate uncertainty but one that is rooted in social and 
economic organization. In this chapter we detail the current economic organization of 
agriculture, and briefly describe its negative impacts on farmers, communities and ecology.  We 
conclude by articulating stories of farmer-led resistance that imagine a new food system.  
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Introduction 
 
The system by which most relatively affluent global consumers obtain their food is 
globalized and industrialized in the same fashion as the rest of the global capitalist system.  An 
increasingly smaller number of actors within global supply chains make many of the decisions 
about the food we eat, from where and how it is grown to how we will obtain it.  While this 
system has produced and marketed a great many tasty and diverse calories for those who can 
afford to participate, the costs of this system have been borne by farmers, food workers, rural 
communities and the ecology in which we are all embedded.  In the way it is shaped and 
organized, the food system is very much like other industries, but food (and water) is unlike 
other consumer goods. Everyone on the planet needs to eat nutritious foods every day to live a 
healthy and productive life.  Thus, we believe food should not be treated like other commodities, 
and the people who produce food, along with a stable agroecosystem, should be protected as 
critical to society. 
The purpose of this chapter is to show how a minority of global actors make many of the 
decisions about what food is produced – where, how, by whom and for whom – and highlight the 
implications of these decisions for farmers, consumers, communities and their environment.  The 
structuring of the relationship along the supply chain from farm to plate, and the globalizing of 
these relationships, has frequently harmed our ecology, rural communities, and the economic 
livelihoods of farmers and food workers.  We explain how farmers and consumers – who often 
have myriad concerns about the implications of the emerging system of food production – are 
mostly shut out of systems of decision-making through the continued consolidation of critical 
points of the supply chain. Instead, decisions are increasingly made by CEOs to meet the narrow 
demands of shareholders of global agrifood firms, whose main concern is to increase their power 
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more than similar firms. We briefly explore some of the consequences of these decisions for 
farmers, rural communities and our ecology.  Still, farmers and consumers in the U.S. and 
globally are not passive bystanders to consolidation and centralization trends and have organized 
in multiple ways to stop, shape or opt-out of them.   
 
Social and Economic Organization of the Food System Has Real Life Impacts 
 
 The organization of the agricultural and food system has important consequences for the 
life chances of farmers, farm and food workers, communities and the environment.  In the last 50 
years, we have reorganized food and farming in the U.S. and across the world towards an 
industrialized system that reduces food – a physiological necessity that has important cultural 
and social meanings – to a commodity to be produced as cheaply as possible and sold to the 
highest bidder.  Even the comparative wealthy (by world standards) farmers in the U.S., Canada 
and Europe end up as relatively powerless participants in food chains over which they have little 
or no control.  Farmers face limited choices in which inputs to use, which crops or livestock to 
produce, and what markets to sell into.  Meanwhile food and farm workers are some of the most 
food insecure in a country where one in eight households may not know where their next meal is 
coming from (Coleman-Jensen et al. 2016).  That a highly industrialized and capitalized food 
system can produce a great number of calories and still leave hungry people, many of them 
involved in the production of food, shows that the tradeoffs farmers, workers and the 
environment are making are not worth the cost to people, communities and the ecosystem in 
which we are embedded.  Here we review the scholarship that examines concerns and documents 
impacts of a concentrated and consolidated agrifood system as a way to prepare readers to fully 
understand the results section, in which we describe the structure in which farmers of all kinds 
are embedded. 
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Let's start with the fact that fewer farmers are able to make a full-time living from 
farming.  For instance, just 40 percent of the two million farms in the U.S. list farming as the 
primary occupation of the farm operator. Less than ten percent of American farms, or 185,346 
farms, are classified as "commercial" by USDA, meaning that they have gross farm sales 
exceeding $350,000.  At first glance, this "upper 10 percent" of farm households appear to be 
doing well in the current food and farming system, having a median net farm income of over 
$146,000 in in 2015 and median household income nearing $200,000 or 3.5 times the median 
U.S. household income (Posey 2016; USDA 2015b).  Perhaps more concerning, 30 percent of 
farm households listing farming as a principal occupation reported a median of just $788 in farm 
income in 2015.  (We should note, however, these farm households reported total household 
median income just over that for all U.S. households because of the contribution of off-farm 
income (USDA 2015b)).   
Table 1: Principal farm operator household finances, by ERS farm typology, 2015 
 
Item Residence 
Farms 
Intermediate 
Farms 
Commercial 
Farms All Farms 
Number of farms  1,215,011 631,942 185,346 2,032,300  
Income, median dollars per household 
Farm income  -2,100 788 146,466 -765 
Off-farm income  82,987 55,750 40,250 67,500 
    Earned Income  62,500 31,789 22,500 38,270 
    Unearned Income  24,000 25,013 9,000 25,013 
Total household income  82,925 59,102 197,980 76,735 
Source: USDA Economic Research Service.  Accessed at 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/DataFiles/48870/table02.xls?v=42704   
 
 
These changes exact real tolls on farmers. In the early 2000s, when Midwestern 
commodity agriculture was reeling from low prices, a Missouri farmer told Hendrickson that 'I 
used to look around to see if any farmers were getting out of farming so I could get their land to 
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farm. Now I look around and see I have no neighbors.'  As one can see in Table 1, three-fifths of 
U.S. farms are residential farms where the operator does not consider farming as their primary 
occupation, while about a tenth gain significant income from farming, leaving a floundering 
"intermediate" set of farms.  Some of these farms may be considered part of the declining 
"Agriculture of the Middle" (Lyson, Stevenson, and Welsh 2008), defined as the decrease in the 
number of farms in mid-sized categories (USDA uses $350,000 to $999,999 in annual 
agricultural sales).  Only 118,000 such farms remained in the 2012 Census of Agriculture 
(USDA 2015a). While fewer than six percent of all U.S. farms, they accounted for about one-
fifth of all agricultural sales and farmland, and over one quarter of net farm income.  Farmers of 
the middle are often left out by the large commodity chains we describe in the results section, but 
also find fewer other mid-range businesses to cooperate with (mid-range processing plants, mid-
sized distributors, or mid-sized grocers) or to supply them with inputs and right-sized equipment 
for planting, harvesting, storing, processing or distributing their product (Legun and Bell 2016).   
Given difficult economics, farmers of the middle, or farms in USDA's "intermediate" 
category, are precisely those who may feel particular pressures to farm in ways incongruent with 
their values or beliefs.  For instance, James and Hendrickson (2008) found evidence from 
Missouri farmers to suggest that financial pressures can increase a farmer's willingness to 
tolerate unethical conduct.  Concentrated markets may cause farmers to feel financially 
pressured, especially as they become relatively dependent within production networks organized 
by transnational agrifood firms (Hendrickson, James, and Heffernan 2013). Hendrickson and 
James (2005) argue that concentrated markets for inputs or agricultural products narrow the 
range of choices that farmers can make about how they treat their land, animals, and workers, 
and even what kind of farming they decide to enter. For instance, a farmer may want to enhance 
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soil quality by practicing multiyear rotations with three to five different crops but is prevented 
because they can't find regional markets for sunflowers or wheat rather than just soybeans and 
corn (Roesch-McNally et al. 2017).  Farmers may also want to practice diversified crop and 
livestock farming but cannot find available markets for smaller numbers of livestock. For 
example, it is essentially impossible for Midwestern farmers who want to use non-genetically 
modified soybeans to access seeds and genetic materials that don't contain any GM traits, as 
nearly 100 percent of soybeans now contain at least one herbicide tolerant trait (see figure 1). 
Stuart and Schewe (2016) document that seed corn contracts in Michigan constrain the choices 
of farmers causing them to over-apply fertilizer to maximize yield, resulting in greenhouse gas 
emissions and water pollution, while Stuart (2009) found that farmers in the Central Coast of 
California felt pressured by their buyers to use practices they felt were ecologically destructive 
and unethical. In short, research has suggested that constrained choices can force farmers into the 
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"kinds of decisions that they otherwise would not have chosen for ethical or other reasons" 
(Hendrickson and James 2005, 283)   
 The decisions these farmers must make also impact their communities. Scholars have 
long been interested in how the social and economic organization of food and farming impacts 
farmers AND communities. Walter Goldschmidt's (1978) seminal study of California 
agricultural organization in the 1940s found industrialized agriculture had adverse community 
effects while smaller-scale family operated farms were associated with diverse economies and 
egalitarian social structures (see for example Heffernan, 1984; Lobao 1990; and Lyson 2004).  In 
their meta-analysis on the relationship between agricultural structure and community well-being, 
Lobao and Stofferahn (2007) found detrimental effects of industrialized farming on communities 
were reported in 82 percent of 51 studies.  These negative effects included greater income 
inequality or poverty; decreased retail trade and diversity of retail firms; population declines; and 
negative health effects of large livestock operations.  Of course, it's not only farmers and rural 
communities who are impacted by changes in food and farming.  Howard (2016a) shows how 
food retail concentration has left many urban neighborhoods without access to affordable 
nutritious foods, and argues that food processing and retail concentration has resulted in fewer 
good jobs and worse treatment of farm and food labor.  
Along with farmers and communities, the ecology in which human society is embedded 
has not been spared the negative impacts of the way we produce and consume food.  The 
organization of the agricultural marketplace, for instance, forces many U.S. farmers into 
specialized monocultures and separates livestock from crop production both at the farm level and 
at larger regional geographies (Lyson 2004). Livestock waste in these systems becomes an 
environmental pollutant rather than a recyclable resource contributing to soil health and fertility.  
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Specialized markets mean that corn and soybeans become the de facto crop rotation across large 
portions of the Corn Belt, which can result in sizable soil loss. To illustrate, soil erosion in Iowa 
costs its farmers $1 billion per year (Eller 2014), and also causes nutrient run-off that contributes 
to the Dead Zone in the Gulf of Mexico (one ton of eroded Midwestern soil can contain over two 
pounds of nitrogen and one pound of phosphorus).1 Soil health advocates encourage farmers to 
plant cover crops (keeping the soil covered and feeding the soil food web), to reduce tillage as 
much as possible, and to increase plant diversity.  However, fewer farmers are on the land 
farming larger acreages making the labor and timing of cover crops challenging. Few if any 
markets exist for diversified crops and livestock meaning crop rotations are limited, and input 
suppliers are oriented to providing seeds, chemicals and equipment for the dominant crops in 
their region.   
The use of herbicides and pesticides in agriculture, combined with mechanization, have 
reduced the number of people needed to farm large acreage.  Nature is dynamic however, and 
weeds and pests have rapidly evolved resistance to widely used chemicals.  The introduction of 
herbicide tolerant crops has magnified this problem in the last 20 years (see list of herbicide 
resistant weeds at www.weedscience.org).  Row crop farmers in the Southeast and Midwest have 
been scrambling in recent years to control a specific herbicide resistant pigweed (Amaranthus 
palmeri), which thrives particularly well in a rapidly changing climate, and has a thick woody 
stalk that causes havoc to farmers' machines.  In 2015, Monsanto introduced dicamba-tolerant 
soybeans and cotton as a way to control this and other resistant weeds; the problem is that 
dicamba can drift when applied in anything less than perfect application conditions, causing 
damage to a wide range of crops.2 In 2016 and 2017, this damage caused considerable tension in 
rural communities, often pitting neighbor against neighbor; conflict over dicamba damage was 
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cited in the murder of an Arkansas farmer by a neighboring Missouri farmhand.3 One can only 
imagine the economic and social pressures that manifested in that confrontation, or the ethical 
conflict over farming choices that may have led to the situation. 
Such ecological impacts can change risk and resilience equations for farmers, 
communities and consumers. Resilience is generally defined as the ability of ecosystems and 
communities to decrease their vulnerability to sudden shocks, and to generate – through 
relationships and processes – options for adaptive change. The industrialization and 
consolidation of agriculture, occurring within a remarkable period of stable, temperate climate 
(King 2008), has increased vulnerability for many farmers and communities and reduced the 
range of options for adaptation from field to plate (Hendrickson 2015). With its lengthening 
supply chain, the industrialization and concentration of the agrifood system results in a lack of 
tight ecological and social feedback loops, compromising adaptive responses that promote 
resilience (Lamine 2015).  For instance, changes that that took place in the Australian dairy 
sector after it was deregulated to orient itself towards competing in the global marketplace 
increased competition between producers, which combined with the increasing power of 
supermarkets to dictate terms, led “producers to manage a system that carries increased risk in 
the physical environment and to animal health and welfare because of higher stocking rates and 
production per cow” (Sinclair et al. 2014, 379). Constrained choices for how farmers can manage 
their agroecosystems in relation to the structure of the markets they participate in leaves little 
room to maneuver ecologically in the face of the unpredictable temperatures, extreme 
precipitation events, droughts, and even wildfires occurring as the climate changes.  To wit, in 
2017, Kansas farmers battled wildfires that burned over 650,000 acres in March, while the first 
weekend in May saw nearly 20 inches of snow. Both events killed thousands of livestock, while 
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the latter flattened a rapidly developing wheat crop.  Sustainable agricultural practices can help 
mitigate damages, but it remains difficult for farmers to prepare for such calamitous weather.  
The discussion above points to an industrial agrifood system in crisis regarding its 
negative economic, social and ecological externalities (Constance et al. 2014a; Howard 2016a; 
Magdoff et al. 2000). This crisis has accelerated steadily over the past 40 years and has now 
reached a tipping point based on the realization that industrial agriculture is the major contributor 
to global climate change. To complicate the scenario, by the year 2050 nine billion people will 
need to be fed without expanding the agricultural land base, while reducing negative 
environmental impacts such as greenhouse gas emissions (Gardner 2009; FAO 2009) leading to 
considerable debate as to the best way to achieve food security for all without destroying our 
ecosystem.  The current economic and social structure of the agrifood system has forced many 
farmers out of farming as a full-time profession in the U.S. and decimated the number of 
smallholder farmers in other countries, while those who remain face consolidated markets that 
narrow the range of choices they can make about what kind of farmer they want to be and how 
they want to manage land, people and animals.  By limiting farmers' ability to manage their 
farms as an ecosystem (also known as agroecology), this consolidated and industrialized 
agriculture system has increased their vulnerability and reduced their resilience in the face of 
emerging threats, such as our changing climate. 
Analyzing the Social and Economic Structure of Food and Farming 
Before we turn to documenting the very structure that causes the impacts we describe 
above, we provide an analytical framework that situates the data in the next section.  Many 
different disciplines have converged around the idea that the current structure of food and 
agriculture can best be thought of as a series of competing global production networks in which 
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actors can be more or less dependent, and thus more or less powerful (Carstensen, Lianos, 
Lombardi, & MacDonald, 2016; James, Hendrickson, & Howard, 2013; Wilkinson, 2006, 
Hendrickson et al. 2008).   A key concept is defining power in the food system, who has it, how 
we can document and/or measure it, and how it is articulated in the structure that we document. 
Power is a crucial element of who can make decisions in the food system, decisions which shape 
the life chances of farmers and workers who produce our food, the vibrancy of the communities 
in which they live, and the ecology on which future food production depends.  In the past, those 
of us involved in the Missouri School of Agrifood Studies (Bonanno 2009) documented the 
increase in concentration in different sectors of the agrifood industry in the U.S. through a series 
of concentration tables, reports, and articles (Constance et al. 2014a).  We showed the four-firm 
concentration ratio in major commodity markets, documented the top four firms in each sector, 
and illustrated transnational agrifood firm linkages across sectors (Heffernan, Hendrickson, & 
Gronski, 1999; Howard, 2009b). We hoped that by documenting the market relationships in the 
agrifood system, we would help farmers, consumers and communities understand the system 
they were part of in order to transform it.   
Our approach is different from other scholarship in economics and law that has primarily 
addressed concerns about agricultural consolidation by studying one aspect – horizontal 
integration which occurs when firms in one sector (for example pork processing) consolidate into 
fewer firms – at one scale, national markets (e.g. Crespi, Saitone, and Sexton 2012; Fuglie et al. 
2011; MacDonald 2016).  These scholars often found little reason to worry about increasing 
consolidation and concentration, arguing that it increased efficiency that in turn produced 
economic gains and that firms did not use their market power to increase prices or to 
discriminate against producers.   
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We admit there are weaknesses in looking only at concentration in certain commodities, 
or employing monopoly-only models of the agrifood system.  For instance, while firms may 
organize themselves into global production networks, those networks may still compete with 
each other while disadvantaging farmers and ecosystems (Hendrickson et al. 2008; Heffernan, 
Hendrickson, and Gronski 1999).  Current concentration and monopoly models also don't 
address the issue of vertical integration and other structural issues in the food and agriculture 
value chain. To remedy these problems, some scholars have worked to differentiate between 
buyer and seller power, or to examine the differing levels of concentration that can harm 
producers, consumers or the public good in different situations  (Foer 2016; Carstensen 2008; 
Carstensen et al. 2016).  While this scholarship can lead to important insights and can result in 
regulatory proposals, Howard (2016a, 11), following Nitzan and Bichler, (2009), proposed a 
more encompassing look at capital as power – "that corporations quantify their perceived 
influence through 'capitalization,'" which can be viewed as a measure of their expected future 
earnings (in present dollars), discounted for perceived risks.  This means that "[c]apitalism as a 
system is therefore better understood as a mode of power rather than a mode of production."  
Mode of production refers to the way we collectively produce what we need to survive as a 
society, and the social relationships that form around it. Mode of power, in contrast, does not 
assume capitalists are driven to increase production (nor consumption), but only their own power 
relative to everyone else, even if it reduces wellbeing. This approach highlights the need to 
understand the social, political and economic relationships that structure the agrifood system. At 
the core of all these works is the desire to describe and understand the power relationships that 
arise in an industrialized, highly capitalized agrifood system in order to address their negative 
impacts.   
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Methods 
 
The Missouri School method is to document economic concentration in an easily 
assessable format that illustrates the breadth and depth of concentration in major agricultural 
commodities and in different sectors of the food system (see Figure 2).  We report the market 
shares in major agricultural commodities, agricultural inputs and food retailing in CR4 tables 
(CR4 is the concentration ratio [CR] of the combined market share of the top four firms in each 
market). We glean the data from trade journals, company annual reports, government reports, 
academic journals and financial newspapers. Sources used in this chapter include trade journals 
and newspapers such as Successful Farming, Farm Futures, European Seed, Reuters, and 
Fortune; government reports from USDA's Economic Research Service and Grain Inspection 
Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA), as well as United Nations agencies such as 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Committee on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD); non-profit research briefs where we have examined and agree with the methods 
Livestock and crop 
farmers
Processors &  
Grain Traders
Food 
Manufacturers
Grocers
Restaurants
Seeds & Breeds
Agrichemicals
Fertilizer
Equipment
Figure 2: Agrifood system supply chain 
illustrating different sectors of the market which 
are highly concentrated. The exception is 
farmers, where approximately 800,000 farmers 
face concentrated markets for inputs and their 
agricultural products. The results section starts 
with the consolidation among farms, then moves 
to inputs (see left) before documenting 
concentration in chain (see above). 
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used including from ETC Group, Food and Water Watch and Oxfam; and academic journals in 
law, economics, policy and sociology.   
We are particularly interested in the top four firms in a specific market for two reasons.  
First, when four firms control more than forty percent of a market the oligopolistic/oligopsonistic 
structure can confer market power to those firms (Breimyer 1965; Connor et al. 1984; Heffernan 
2000; Hendrickson and James 2005). Second, the theory of small group behavior indicates that 
actors in small groups generally inform their own actions through observation of other actors, 
rather than openly discussing actions with others (Olson 1965).  As noted above, CR4 is a rather 
simplistic monopoly model, which we recognize provides an imperfect assessment of power 
relationships within a particular commodity (James, Hendrickson and Howard 2013). The utility 
of the CR4 tables is the snapshot of the dominant players in and across particular commodities 
that helps farmers and community members understand the wide reach of corporate actors. 
Because we are interested in consolidation and concentration issues across the food system, one 
of our major contributions is the identification of the top firms by name to document the progress 
of cross-commodity integration.  Reading company reports, trade journals and financial 
newspapers also allows us to glean information about potential strategies that different actors 
pursue, as well as industry insights into the implications of those strategies.   
Results: The Structure of the Food and Farming System 
 
In the following pages, we attempt to provide a snapshot of different markets across the 
food chain (see Figure 2), which starts with the inputs farmers use to produce agricultural 
commodities, the commodity markets into which they sell, and the food processing and food 
retailing sectors that have driven a large number of changes in the marketplace in the last 25 
years.  We describe each link of the agrifood chain, the way markets have changed and the 
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implications of those changes.  But first, we want to provide a snapshot of what has happened to 
farmers in the last 50 years.   
We have lost one-third of the farms that existed in 1964, and half of the remaining two 
million farms produce less than $10,000 in annual sales (USDA 2012). Using the median size of 
crop acres or number of animals, MacDonald (2016) shows increasing consolidation at the farm 
level in the United States, where median farm size in cropland more than doubled between 1982 
and 2012, and increased even more rapidly in livestock (see Table 2). Illustrating that the 
"Agriculture of the Middle" is declining and perhaps facing extinction, he documents that "the 
number of farms with milk cows or hogs fell by about 70%, while those with fed cattle 
[steers/heifers for market] or contracts for broiler production fell by 30%" (ibid, 5).   
 
 The trends toward large-scale farms in the US (mirrored in Canada) have been on the 
leading edge of global shifts, suggesting what may happen to farms elsewhere that begin to 
industrialize with global capitalist markets.  Lowder, Skoet, and Raney (2016,27) show that 
"[f]rom 1960 to 2000, average farm size decreased in most low- and lower-middle-income 
countries and in South Asia as a whole. It decreased from 1960 to 1990 in Latin America and the 
Caribbean as a whole, before increasing from 1990 to 2000. Average farm size increased from 
Table 2: Structural Change in U.S. Livestock Production 
Item 1987 2012 
Midpoint farm sizes 
Broilers (annual sales/removals) 300,000 680,000 
Cattle feeding (annual sales/removals) 17,532 38,369 
Hogs (annual sales/removals) 1,200 40,000 
Milk cows (herd size) 80 900 
Number of farms with 
Contract broiler production 22,000 15,830 
Cattle feeding 112,109 77,120 
Hogs 243,398 63,246 
Milk cows 202,068 64,098 
Source: MacDonald 2016 p. 5  
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1960 to 2000 in some upper-middle-income countries and in nearly all high-income 
countries…."  Oya (2013) reminds us, however, that farm scale does not neatly define or 
describe the relations of production, rather we need to understand global agrifood commodity 
relationships, or as we conceive of it - the mode of power - that is shaping how people can 
participate in the food system.  
Concentration in the Markets for Inputs Required to Raise Crops and Livestock 
Fewer and larger farms signifies that farmers are replacing management and inputs 
produced on the farm with capital-intensive inputs from off the farm in many sectors of 
agriculture, especially in the production of pork, poultry, dairy, and row crops and within large 
vegetable, fruit and nursery operations.  When this happens, consolidation in the input markets 
becomes a serious concern to the farmers who remain.  In the past two decades, mergers of 
enormous firms have occurred in the farm machinery, fertilizer, seeds and agrichemical sectors. 
Of increasing concern is ownership in the digital age, including data, codes and programming 
upon which commercial farmers have come to rely; even smaller scale row-crop farms use GPS 
systems to manage soil fertility, irrigation, and especially yield data, while farmers with recently 
purchased tractors or combines cannot legally fix the machines themselves (Carolan 2017).  
Since the late 1990s, the seed industry has consolidated rapidly both in the U.S. and 
globally.  The introduction of Round-up Ready seeds in the mid-1990s spurred rapid 
consolidation among seed companies and convergence between seed and chemical companies   
(Howard 2009b).  Essentially, a chemical company, Monsanto, became the dominant seed firm 
with the acquisition of more than 50 seed firms (see Table 3). Fuglie et al. (2011) estimated a 
concentration ratio for the top four firms (CR4) of 54 percent of global commercial seed market, 
with certain segments even more concentrated (for example, the global vegetable seed market 
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has a CR4 of 70 percent, while in the late 2000s the CR4 for the U.S. cottonseed, corn seed, and 
soybean seed were all over 50 percent, see Figure 3). In the last two years, major mergers 
between the largest seed and chemical companies have been proposed or approved.  Bayer has 
sought to merge with Monsanto, while the Dow-DuPont merger is nearly complete.  If the 
mergers are approved, the new firms would control half of the global commercial seeds market 
(see Table 3). Lianos, Katalevsky, and Ivanov (2016, 1) argue that "[r]ecent merger activity in 
this sector … illustrates its rapid transformation from an already concentrated industry to a tight 
oligopoly on a global scale."   
Much of the concentration in seeds has been spurred by proprietary agricultural 
biotechnology that makes it illegal for farmers to save seed and also promotes tight coordination 
between seed and chemical companies, especially regarding herbicide resistant traits. In the 
1990s and 2000s firms that had traditionally focused on agrochemicals, like Syngenta, Monsanto 
and DuPont, moved into the seed industry (UNCTAD 2006). In the agrochemical sector, ETC 
Group (2013) notes that six global firms (Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta, Bayer, Dow, and 
Figure 1: USDA seed market data prior to 2016 merger announcements. (MacDonald 2017) 
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BASF)4 controlled three-quarters of all private sector plant breeding research, nearly three-fifths 
of the commercial seed market and over three-quarters of global agrochemical sales. ChemChina 
acquired Syngenta, which was the third largest global seed company and largest agrochemical 
company with over one-fifth of the global market in 2011 (ETC Group 2013). If the announced 
large mergers in the seed and agrochemical arena proceed without required divestures, three 
firms would sell 70 percent of agrichemicals globally based on their 2011 sales (see Table 3 
which uses figures compiled by ETC Group 2013).  
Table 3: Global Seed  & Agrichemical Companies 
Seed Company & Global 
Rank on Global Seed Sales 
Concentration Ratio of 
Global Proprietary Seed 
Market (Current) 
Merger 
Partner 
Percent of Global 
Proprietary Seed Market 
of Combined Firm 
(Estimated) 
Monsanto (1)  Bayer (7) 29%  
DuPont (2)  Dow (8) 18% 
Syngenta (3)   9% 
Vilmorin (4)  CR4 – 54%  5% 
WinField (5)     
KWS (6)    
Bayer CropScience (7)  Monsanto (1)  
Dow Agrosciences (8) CR8 – 63% DuPont (8)  
Agrichemical Company & 
Global Rank  
Concentration Ratio of 
Global Agrichemical 
Market (Current) 
Merger 
Partner 
Percent of Global 
Agrichemical Market of 
Combined Firm 
(Estimated) 
Syngenta (1)  ChemChina 
(7) 
29% 
Bayer CropScience (2)  Monsanto (5) 25% 
BASF (3)   12% 
Dow Agrosciences (4) CR4 – 62% DuPont (6) 16% 
Monsanto (5)    
DuPont (6)  Dow (4)  
ChemChina (7)  Syngenta (1)  
Nufarm (8) CR8 – 87%   
Sources: ETC Group (2013), Fuglie et al (2011) 
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No one can explain better than farmers what is happening.  In 2010, a number of farmers 
testified at workshops on agricultural competition organized by the U.S. Departments of Justice 
and Agriculture.  In Iowa, Todd Leak from North Dakota gave a farmer's view of the changes we 
documented above: 
"I farm 2,000 acres with my brother in central Grand Forks County, North 
Dakota. I'm a soybean farmer for 30 years, and maybe about a decade ago [in 
2000], I was free to choose from about a hundred different varieties of non-GMO 
soybeans…Today there's about 123 varieties of GMO soybeans that I have to 
choose from and about 12 non-GMO. Of those 12 non-GMO varieties, 6 of those 
are for the specialty food grade … market … 6 that remained to me were 
developed in the 1980s and 1990s and their disease packages, their host resistance 
are far less than the GMO varieties, and their yield is only about 70 percent of the 
GMO varieties, and that is not because of the GMOs. GMOs do not increase 
yield. There is no yield gene trait. The issue is that all of the research, all of the 
breeding, is going into proprietary genetically modified varieties …I am therefore 
forced as a farmer to have to go to the seed companies, these few seed companies 
that are left, to purchase my seed." (U.S. Departments of Justice and Agriculture 
2010, 126-127) 
 
Many – but not all – farmers at the Iowa hearing agreed. Fred Bower, a Minnesota farmer and 
seed dealer, lamented the decrease in the number of seed companies from 50 when he started 
farming in the 1970s to four in 2010. He complained that he was "not being treated properly as 
far as price. When the amount of seed dealers goes down, the competition decreases, and they 
kind of run the show of what they want to say is the price. It was way better to have more seed 
companies involved than to have fewer seed companies at the present time and pay through the 
nose." (U.S. Departments of Justice and Agriculture 2010, 132) An Indiana farmer pleaded that 
"I need a choice of seed. I'm down to planting three varieties of public soybeans." (U.S. 
Departments of Justice and Agriculture 2010, 139)  
As farmer Leak's testimony indicated, it is difficult to disentangle seeds, chemicals and 
agriculture biotechnology. Moss (2016,11) reported that "[i]n 2009, the 'Big 6' biotechnology 
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firms (Monsanto, DuPont-Pioneer, Syngenta, Dow, Bayer, and BASF) held greater than 95% of 
trait acres for corn, soybeans, and cotton in the U.S., with Monsanto alone accounting for 90% of 
those acres." A recent article in Successful Farming, highlights new linkages that will arise with 
the proposed merger between Bayer-Monsanto:  
"Monsanto is largely in the seeds and traits business, while Bayer concentrates on 
chemicals. …74% of Monsanto’s 2016 sales came from seeds and traits, with the 
remaining 26% coming from crop protection chemicals. Bayer’s flipped the other way. It 
derived 85% of its 2016 sales from crop protection chemicals, with just 15% coming 
from seeds and traits. Little overlap exists between the companies in the global seed and 
traits space for corn and soybeans. Monsanto’s 36% market share in corn would not 
change if the firms combined. In soybeans, Monsanto’s current 27% market share would 
rise to just 28% if the Bayer Monsanto merger went through." (Gullickson 2017, n.p.) 
Because access to genetically modified traits is so important in the current seed market, the Big 6 
firms have engaged in a number of cross licensing agreements for traits that Howard (2015)  
convincingly argues increase consolidation in the sector and raise already high barriers to entry 
(for a history of how these agreements have developed see Howard 2016a).  There is also the 
much despised patent enforcement at the farm level. A 2008 Vanity Fair article detailed 
Monsanto tactics aimed at enforcing patents that included videotaping and photographing 
farmers, and infiltrating community meetings to the point where their investigators were termed 
the "seed police" (Bartlett and Steele 2008, n.p.). 
As we see in Table 4, livestock genetics are also highly concentrated, especially for 
poultry and swine production that takes place in confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs).  
Research on nearly all of global poultry genetics and close to two-thirds of cattle and swine 
genetics is controlled by four firms (ETC Group 2013;see also Gura 2007).  Concentration in 
both seed and livestock genetics raises a number of important issues alongside the fact that 
farmers must now use more capital to access genetics while also having fewer choices about 
what kinds of seeds or breeds to use.  Genetic concentration is a growing concern, especially in 
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terms of disappearing livestock breeds (FAO 2015), which means animals may be more 
susceptible to evolving pathogens (Howard 2016a) or could also be less resilient in the face of 
climate change (Hendrickson 2015).  
 
Table 4: Concentration in Livestock Genetics 
Turkeys  Laying hens  Broilers  Swine 
EW Group  EW Group  EW Group  Genus 
Hendrix Genetics Hendrix Genetics Tyson Hendrix Genetics 
  Groupe Grimaud  Groupe Grimaud 
   Smithfield/WH Group 
CR2 99% CR2 94% CR3 95% Four firms control 2/3 of 
research & development 
Source: Adapted from Howard (2016a) based on data from ETC Group (2013). 
 
While improved genetics in seeds and breeds certainly increased agricultural productivity 
(yield), about half the gains made in the 20th century owes to inorganic fertilizers, particularly for 
critical crop nutrients such as nitrogen (N), phosphorous (P) and potassium (K), also commonly 
referred to as potash (Aziz et al. 2015).  Maintaining and enhancing soil fertility has been one of 
the key struggles of human civilization; Montgomery (2012) argues that many great civilizations 
have collapsed due to the exhaustion of soils.  Europe's vigorous imperialistic search for external 
sources of N was solved by the development of synthetic N (Foster and Magdoff 2000), while 
industrial mining techniques facilitated trade in P and K. These 20th century developments led to 
the capital-intensive fertilizer industry that has long been controlled by sprawling transnational 
firms, or even cartels of large vertically integrated firms, with substantial support from national 
governments.  Global fertilizer companies such as Yara, Potash Corp, Agrium, Mosaic, OCP 
(Morocco) and a Russia-based potash cabal dominate the market (Taylor and Moss 2013). In 
2016, Potash Corp and Agrium announced merger plans to create the largest fertilizer company 
in the world.  Taylor and Moss (2013) argue that global fertilizer producers have been able to act 
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"in a coordinated fashion" on price, but that buyer power on the part of markets in places like 
India and China have potentially curtailed those actions. The U.S. and Canada have legally 
sanctioned export cartels in fertilizers, primarily in the phosphorus industry, where Taylor and 
Moss (2013) identify a duopoly, Potash Corp and Mosaic called PhosChem, that controls 52 
percent of the world's phosphorus (P) trade. PotashCorp, Agrium and Mosaic also cooperated in 
a legally sanctioned export cartel, Canpotex, which accounted for 61 percent of the world potash 
trade.  
Farmers have also seen the farm machinery sector consolidate rapidly in the past two to 
three decades, in North America and globally, with a few large firms dominating machinery 
markets across the world. As discussed above, mechanization has spurred specialization and 
centralization in U.S. agriculture, resulting in high capital costs for farmers raising commodity 
crops or livestock.  John Deere is the largest domestic and global agricultural machinery firm, 
followed by CNH Industrial (a merger of Fiat and CNH Global) and AGCO, which includes 
many iconic brands such as Massey-Ferguson, Gleaner and White. In 2011, 10 global firms had 
sales greater than $1 billion, accounting for over one-third of the global market. In just 15 years 
between 1994 and 2009, the four largest machinery manufactures increased their market share 
from 28 to 50 percent of global sales (Fuglie et al. 2011).  
 Concerns about consolidation in the agricultural machinery market arise in two different 
arenas.  One regards digital information in terms of who captures it, who uses it and who owns it.  
Precision agriculture, developed with the aid of GPS systems, has been an important tool for 
farmers to monitor their soil fertility, crop yields and input use. Nearly three-quarters of U.S. 
corn acres employ precision agriculture practices (Carolan 2017).  Arguably precision agriculture 
has significant ecological benefits, particularly in the reduction of fertilizer and pesticide use – 
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up to 30-40 percent according to some analysts (Burger 2016). Such reductions in input factors 
potentially jeopardize the business models that the Big 6 seed/chemical firms rely on, hence their 
interest in acquiring farm management software and digital companies. Farmers worry because 
precision agriculture relies on the transmission of substantial amounts of data from tractors, 
harvesters, sprayers in crop production, and from electronic tags, feeding equipment and milking 
equipment in livestock production. Farmers have concerns about the ownership of this data, as 
well as the value of such large amounts of data to powerful market actors. Brian Marshall, a 
member of the American Farm Bureau Federation, testified before the U.S. Congress that 
"[v]irtually every company says it will never share, sell or use the data in a market-distorting 
way - but we would rather verify than trust" (Plume 2014, n.p.). Plume also writes that large 
companies are trying to figure out how to position themselves for the future, when more farmers 
will participate in data sharing.  Monsanto's ownership of Climate Corporation, which 
specializes in collecting and analyzing soil and weather data to allow farmers to make "data-
driven" decisions, was considered a key enticement for Bayer's offer to buy Monsanto, as Bayer 
has lagged behind in developing data platforms.5 As Monsanto's CEO, Hugh Grant, says, "The 
company of the future won’t just be selling seeds and chemicals, but seeds and chemicals and 
data as a service" (Murray 2016, n.p.). 
A second concern regards innovation, which has long been a source of pride for farmers 
who adapted their machinery to improve its fit with their needs.  One only needs to read 
magazines like Farm Show or Successful Farming to find multiple examples of farmers 
"hacking" machinery and sharing their insights with other farmers.  In a rare case, the U.S. 
Department of Justice blocked a proposed merger of Deere and Precision Planting (Monsanto) 
because the merger would hamper farmer innovation in retrofitting their planting toolbars. Still 
24 
 
the top two precision planter manufacturers control over 80 percent of the high-speed precision 
planting equipment market (U.S. Department of Justice, 2016). Some analysts speculate that as 
combined seed/chemical firms struggle to increase power faster than other firms, they will be 
vulnerable to takeover by machinery firms. Thus, we could potentially see greater levels of 
bundling of input packages, comparable to when chemical firms took over the seed industry. As 
long-time agricultural concentration observer Pat Mooney (2017, 4) writes, "At least since the 
new millennium, the dominant farm machinery companies have invested heavily in satellite and 
sensor information and Big Data management. With this data, the machinery companies stand to 
know more about the inputs and outcomes of every field than any other company and even the 
farmer. Machinery companies have the “box” in which the other input companies have to put 
their seeds, pesticides and fertilizers." 
Beyond the Farm Gate: Where Can Farmers Sell their Products? 
 
While farmers are facing decreased choice in which inputs to use, they also face just a 
few processors or grain traders through which to market their agricultural products.  Globally, 
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus are often referred to as the 
ABCDs of the global grain trade because of their dominant position in moving grain between 
nations (Murphy, Burch, and Clapp 2012; Howard 2016a). In the U.S. grain sector four or fewer 
firms control nearly all of cane sugar processing, over four-fifths of the wet corn milling, beet 
sugar processing, and soybean crushing markets (Adjemian et al. 2016).  For flour milling, just 
one joint venture, Ardent Mills (co-owned by Cargill, ConAgra and CHS), controls 
approximately one-third of the market, leaving farmers in some parts of the country few options 
to sell their wheat (Howard 2016b).   
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The same situation exists in the livestock sector as demonstrated in Table 5. Farmers rely 
on the same dominant firms across the entire protein (chicken, pork and beef) sector, including 
Tyson Foods, JBS, and Smithfield (held by WH Group from China).  While we report primarily 
U.S. data, the rise of just a few firms dominating the protein sector is a global phenomenon. 
Table 5: Concentration in the US Protein Sector 
Commodity & CR4^ Firm Rankings 
Broilers (51% CR4)* 
 
 
1. Tyson Foods** 
2. Pilgrim's (owned by JBS)  
3. Sanderson Farms Inc.  
4. Perdue 
*Note that JBS and Tyson each have more than double the market share of either Sanderson Farms or Perdue. 
Turkeys (57% CR4)* 1. Butterball** 
2. Jennie-O 
3. Cargill 
4. Farbest Foods 
Steer & Heifer Slaughter (85% CR4)* 
 
1. Tyson** 
2. JBS   
3. Cargill  
4. National Beef 
*Note that the top three firms have three-fourths of the market. 
Pork Slaughter (66% CR4)* 
 
1.Smithfield/WH Group*** 
2.JBS 
3.Tyson 
4. Hormel 
^CR4 refers to the percent of the market controlled by the top four firms.  
*Source: USDA GIPSA 2016 
** Sources: Watts Poultry USA March 2017; Tyson Factbook 
***Sources: National Hog Farmer 
 
Take the case of Tyson Foods. After rising to dominance as the largest poultry company 
in the United States through aggressive mergers and acquisitions during the 1980s, Tyson began 
to diffuse this “Southern Model” (Constance 2008) of poultry production into Mexico in 1988 
through a joint venture with Mexican and Japanese companies. By 2003 it was the second largest 
poultry firm in Mexico. During this same time, the company acquired, or developed joint 
ventures with, numerous companies around the world, most importantly obtaining Iowa Beef 
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Packers (IBP) in 2001, which allowed it to become the largest meat packer in the world with 
major holdings in beef and pork added to its poultry (broilers and turkey) portfolio. Tyson 
perfected its global expansion model in Mexico and during the late 2000s, expanded aggressively 
into the emerging markets in Brazil, India, China and other countries globally (Constance et al. 
2010).  
Brazil's JBS followed Tyson’s model with several acquisitions starting in the early 2000s 
to become the largest meat company and beef packer in the world. These purchases included, 
among several others, the assets of Swift Foods (beef) in the U.S., Australia, and Latin America; 
Cargill’s pork operations in the U.S.; and Pilgrim’s Pride (poultry) in the U.S. and Mexico. JBS 
benefitted from substantial investments from Brazilian government-owned banks, but was forced 
to sell some operations in summer 2017 after admitting to corruption in Brazil (Howard 2017). 
Interestingly, this government support gave JBS an advantage over Tyson in Latin America, and 
as a result, Tyson sold its Mexico and Brazil divisions to JBS in 2014.  
Smithfield, facing credit issues after the financial crisis in 2007-2008, was acquired by 
WH Group, a Chinese firm that has significant ties to the Chinese government (Howard 2017). 
WH/Smithfield is the world's largest pork producer, with 1.1 million sows in production 
worldwide, including holdings in the U.S., Mexico, Poland and Romania,6 and it is rapidly 
expanding its poultry operations in China. WH Group has announced its intention to acquire 
more international competitors, with the goal of becoming the world’s largest packaged meat 
firm (Sito 2016). At the time of this writing, WH Group is seeking to acquire beef and poultry 
assets in Europe and North America, partially because these regions' cheap grain and strong 
demand for meat increase profitability (Polansek and Zhu 2017).  Howard (2017) argues that 
these global meatpackers, notably WH Group, JBS and Tyson Foods, have increased 
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significantly in size over the last decade, partly due to government subsidies, especially in the 
first two cases. Their global scope also allows these firms to circumvent national regulations, 
such as import bans or higher tax rates, via the use of subsidiaries in other countries (Degan and 
Wong 2012). 
Consolidation in the livestock sector has been accompanied by increased use of contracts 
and forward contracting,7 with a transparently negotiated cash market all but disappearing.  
According to USDA's GIPSA (2016), nearly three-fifths of the steers and heifers slaughtered for 
our dinner plates were procured using a formula pricing system that references an exogenous 
price (either based on a dwindling cash market or cattle futures), with only 30 percent of total 
steers and heifers procured moving through the cash market, which is half what it was in 2007.  
In the past, cash markets have been valued by farmers as they were established in places where 
several buyers might bid on a single group of cattle or hogs and the farmer had the choice of 
whether or not to accept that price.  Today cash markets are residual markets. To illustrate, an 
Iowa farmer, Eric Nelson, had this to say in the 2010 workshops: "The fewer competitors, 
particularly in my cattle operation, it's not unusual in a week's time that we're down to 15 and 20 
minutes cash market per week compared to a grain producer maybe has 1,500 minutes a week in 
order to make grain sales, and it's because there are only a handful of end users in the cattle 
market" (U.S. Departments of Justice and Agriculture 2010, 62).  
 The situation is worse in pork production, where only two percent of hogs are marketed 
through negotiated cash markets, with the remainder of hog production procured through 
formula pricing and marketing agreements (GIPSA 2016).  The latter two forms often relied on 
the cash market as the basis for their own formulas for paying producers. The disappearance of 
the cash market indicates the hog sector has moved into very similar marketing arrangements as 
28 
 
have existed in broilers, eggs and turkeys for several decades (Breimyer 1965). These 
arrangements do not use a transparent marketplace to negotiate the actual price per pound or 
animal; instead, broiler integrators use a complicated and purposefully opaque formula to pay 
their growers.  Thirty-five large hog producers now own two-thirds of U.S. sows, with the top 
four firms owning 1.74 million sows or about 30 percent of the total.8  Economists sometimes 
refer to these as "thin" markets, or markets where there are "few purchasers, low trading volume 
and low liquidity" (Adjemian. et al. 2016, 2).  Adjemian  et al. (2016) argue that small producers 
are often left out in thinning markets because of the costs of using contracts, as well as the 
economies of scale that favor larger producers, even though they find no impact on prices 
received by producers in thinning markets.  The structure of these end markets is reflected in 
what's happened on farms (see Table 2), where less than 10 percent of farms with hogs and pigs 
produced 50 percent of all hogs and pigs sales, with similar numbers for dairy and poultry 
(Adjemian et al. 2016).  While farmers may not have the data scholars do, they know the 
problems.  During hearings on competition in agriculture, farmers "charged that the thinning of 
spot markets reduces market transparency, denies producers opportunities, reduces their 
bargaining power, and yields prices not accurately reflecting underlying supply and demand” 
(U.S. Department of Justice 2012, 12). 
Retailers Drive Changes 
Consolidation in commodity processing has been matched by increasing concentration in 
food retailing, where food retailers have been accused by farmers and workers of exerting market 
power to force lower prices back through the system to the farm gate (U.S. Department of Justice 
2012).   In the decade after Wal-Mart started selling groceries in the late 1980s, traditional 
grocers like Kroger acquired regional firms to become truly national, coast to coast retailers 
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(Howard 2016a;Hendrickson et al. 2001).  Today, the top four food retailers sell Americans over 
60 percent of their groceries.9 Through the 1990s, traditional grocery retailers like Kroger or 
Safeway dominated the particular metro markets in which they operated, but Wal-Mart's entry 
into food retailing prompted national and international mergers (Howard 2016a).  Wal-Mart also 
brought a different business model to groceries, focusing on supply chain efficiencies and 
negotiating with suppliers for the lowest price.  As the firm gained power in the grocery market, 
they exerted pressure on suppliers, which in turn motivated mergers among suppliers. For 
example, Tyson acquired IBP to supply the whole protein case (everything from chicken legs to 
pork chops to hamburger) to Wal-Mart (Hendrickson et al. 2001). Many food manufacturers, 
especially in the packaged food space, might derive at least 20 percent of their net sales from 
Wal-Mart stores.10 Food and Water Watch (2013, 2) summed up the grocery landscape this way: 
"The top companies controlled an average of 63.3 percent of the sales of 100 types of 
groceries….In 32 of the grocery categories, four or fewer companies controlled at least 75 
percent of the sales. In six categories, the top companies had more than 90 percent of the sales, 
including baby formula and microwave dinners…. Retailers exert leverage by picking and 
choosing their suppliers, but suppliers rely on a few retailers for the bulk of their sales."   
In the summer of 2017, a new disruption in food retail emerged with Amazon's 
acquisition of Whole Foods.  Kowitt (2017) suggests that the $800 billion grocery business and 
its suppliers may be in for a new round of cost-cutting reminiscent of what happened to 
publishers and bookstores as Amazon built its book business. The new parent firm immediately 
dropped Whole Foods prices on organic rotisserie chicken, bananas, apples and avocados by 
approximately 30 percent, for example. Cost cutting in the food industry has often (if not 
exclusively) been borne by farmers, workers and small businesses.   
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Finally, we should mention that the last decade has seen large changes in the locations of 
where Americans actually nourish themselves.  USDA's Economic Research Service reports that 
by 2013, the percentage of dollars spent on food away from home matched those spent for food 
to be consumed at home.11  Concentration in the restaurant and food service market can also be a 
concern for farmers and other suppliers.  Howard (2016a) reports that four firms have over 40 
percent of the fast food market (McDonald's, Yum! Brands, Doctor's Associates, Inc. [Subway], 
and Wendy's). Two distributors, Sysco and U.S. Foods dominate food distribution to food 
services such as restaurants, hospitals and hotels/hospitality concerns.12  One firm, 7-Eleven, has 
nearly one-quarter of the U.S. convenience store market (Howard 2016a). For farmers, the 
consolidation in food distribution, retailing and restaurants means there are fewer players for the 
firms which buy farm gate products to sell to – essentially the very firms who have power over 
farmers find themselves in a less powerful position vis-à-vis food distributors or grocers.  Why 
does this matter? Market power exercised at the retail level extracts concessions from the food 
processor, which in turn extracts concessions from the farmer who has no one (outside of the 
farm ecology or farmworkers) to extract concessions from.  More practically, farmers providing 
alternative produce, meat, or dairy items can find themselves in a catch-22; too small to supply a 
firm like U.S. Foods even when customers would like to order from them yet too large to direct 
market.   
In summary, the industrialization and consolidation of agriculture has meant that farmers 
specialize in certain crops or in single animal production; specialization has meant significant 
capitalization.  Markets for seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and farm machinery have consolidated 
both in North America and globally in the last two decades constraining the choices farmers have 
of which seed varieties, animal genetics, soil fertility practices or pest and weed management 
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strategies to use.  Knowledge and information in managing farms (i.e. precision agriculture or 
genetically-modified seeds) has also commodified during this time, becoming a significant 
source of power for transnational firms.  Farmers face limited choice of where to sell their 
products as major commodity markets, especially in grains and livestock, are consolidated.  
Finally, large grocers exert power over suppliers in consolidated food retail market. 
  
Discussion: Resisting and Reshaping the Agrifood System 
 
While it may seem the structural conditions in the agrifood industry that we have 
described are insurmountable, in reality they are created and shaped by human actors.  The 
"Emancipatory Question" then becomes "what kind of agrifood system might decrease injustice 
and inequality" and how do we achieve it (Constance 2009, 9)? In this section, we showcase how 
farmers in North America and across the globe, along with workers and consumers, have fought 
back against the changes we described above, to stop them, to shape them or to go around them.   
First the bad news; resistance to this highly coordinated, capitalized and industrialized 
agrifood system has been fragmented and less than successful at stopping the larger trends 
(Constance et al. 2014a).  After four decades of anti-trust reinterpretation to a singular focus on 
efficiency and price (Howard 2016a), farmers joined with allies in pressing the Obama 
Administration for movement on anti-trust issues, resulting in a series of workshops exploring 
competition in agriculture and food markets in 2010.13 What began as a bang, ended with a 
whimper when the final report issued by the U.S. Departments of Justice and Agriculture 
claimed that "anticompetitive mergers and discussions represented only a portion of the concerns 
voiced at the workshops" and that claims about "fairness, safety, promotion of foreign trade, and 
environmental welfare" were outside the purview of anti-trust law (U.S. Department of Justice 
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2012, 3). In another form of grassroots resistance, organic production and distribution systems 
grew out of environmental concerns about overuse of synthetic chemicals, health concerns about 
what those chemicals did to human bodies, and social concerns about small-scale farmers. 
Today, however, the organic challenge has become "standardized resistance" (Howard 2009a, 
2016a) with coopted certification schemes that have shoehorned a broad movement with multiple 
goals into a narrowly defined set of production practices (Jaffee and Howard 2010; Guthman 
2008).  Other farmers and consumers have turned to community or local food systems as a way 
to subvert the consolidated food system. Mount (2012) and DeLind (2011) worry that these 
projects, founded on authentic relationships and democratic participation are being stripped of 
their potential for radical transformation as they scale up to find efficiencies and lose sight of 
original goals. Indeed this is exactly what scholars would expect in a system embedded in the 
"mode of power" we described.  
Still, as Howard (2016a) argues, there have been some small successes, particularly in the 
areas of removing objectionable ingredients (such as extruded beef, also known as "pink slime" 
or rBGH in milk), improving animal welfare practices through both market (for example, 
movements toward cage-free poultry in the U.S.) and government regulation (such as banning 
the use of gestation crates for sows in the European Union), and marginally improving wages 
through consumer campaigns (e.g., Coalition of Immokalee Workers).  It would be tempting to 
stop here, acknowledging that the existing mode of power is very difficult to transform. 
However, our commitment to the possibilities of transformation requires us to examine patient, 
long-term struggles. In fact, following Nitzan and Bichler (2012), it may be that the all-
encompassing mode of power we have described in this chapter is approaching the limits to what 
society will accept (e.g. the seed industry is having difficulty increasing prices to farmers, 
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declining beer sales are forcing the two global brewers to look to non-alcoholic beverages for 
growth).  While Nitzan and Bichler are optimistic that at some point resistance will overcome 
(agrifood) capitals' ability to continue to concentrate and the latter's power will disintegrate, this 
hope remains an empirical question that has not yet been answered. 
Restoring Fairness and Competition in the American Agrifood System 
Against all odds, farmers continue authentic calls for justice through democratic 
institutions such as the courts and government policy.  In 1996, a group of cattlemen filed suit 
against then IBP (later Tyson) alleging that the firm was large enough to control prices, claiming 
that the firm artificially depressed prices by around five percent, thereby giving the company one 
free out of every 20 cattle purchased (Harris 2004). The suit, filed under the Packers and 
Stockyards Act of 1921, was given class status in 2001, and proceeded to trial in 2004 (Taylor 
2007). The jury awarded a $1.3 billion verdict, even though Taylor (2007) argues the plaintiffs 
generally were seeking injunctive relief to stop the practice rather than monetary damages.  The 
judge in the case almost immediately overturned the ruling, and the U.S. Supreme Court refused 
to hear the cattlemen's appeal.  At the 2009 Organization for Competitive Markets annual 
meeting, the lead plaintiffs' attorney, David Domina, urged the audience to stay engaged and to 
fight for new competition policies at the Congressional level because the judicial system had 
shown it was unsympathetic to these claims.14  While this is a depressing story that starkly 
underscores the weak position of producers under the current mode of power in agrifood, it is 
also significant that a jury – which had access to the actual financial details presented at trial – 
found for the plaintiffs, legitimizing their complaint.  Moreover, antitrust scholars have 
redoubled their efforts to examine buyer power issues, and some expressed concern that the 
judge muddled the statues and thus the legal proceedings when overturning the jury judgement 
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(Taylor 2007).   The case also helped to lay the groundwork for establishing rules to define the 
ninety-year-old Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA), resulting in new provisions to amend the act 
in the 2008 Farm Bill.  After a long fight, a new rule went into effect in 2012 (Greene 2016). 
Despite having won in both Congress (with new directions to interpret the PSA in the Farm Bill) 
and the Obama Administration (new rules were promulgated and enacted), activist farm 
organizations lost the battle because Congress refused to appropriate money for USDA's GIPSA 
to enforce the PSA. 
These so-called "GIPSA rules" were also influenced by the work of farmers and their 
allies in the early 2000s, when sixteen state attorneys-general drafted a model "Producer 
Protection Act," some of which was adopted in individual states (Peck, 2006; Wu and 
MacDonald 2015).  Along with the beef producers mentioned above, contract poultry growers 
have fought long and hard to get new rules for contract growers into federal policy.  In December 
2016, USDA announced a set of "Farmer Fair Practices Rules" which were declared to target the 
most harmful practices aimed at poultry growers, and to restore fairness within the PSA by 
defining unfair practices and undue preferences.15 While broadly supported by organizations 
such as the National Farmers Union, Organization for Competitive Markets, contract poultry 
growers associations, and even the American Farm Bureau, the rules are unpopular with 
organizations with mixed memberships of industry and farmers and ranchers, such as the 
National Pork Producers Association and the National Cattlemen's Beef Association (Farm 
Futures 2017). The rules were withdrawn by the Trump Administration in 2017.  
While not the victory farmers were looking for, these fights demonstrate that continued 
resistance can be important in shaping the playing field, building new alliances with consumers, 
and planting seeds for the future. In recent years, media attention shined light on the plight of 
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contract growers through sharp comedy on John Oliver's Last Week Tonight in 2016 and Chris 
Leonard's 2014 expose of the poultry industry in The Meat Racket.  On another front, economists 
like Wu and MacDonald (2015, 5) acknowledge that tradeoffs between efficiency, the need to 
reduce unnecessary costs of production, transportation or regulation in order to achieve more 
economic gains, and distribution, which is dividing the gains fairly, may need to be addressed, 
potentially by separating regulations derived from antitrust law from those derived from tort law. 
Using the latter to address concerns around competition could "facilitate regulatory oversight of 
policies that enhance transparency, protect property rights, and prohibit misinformation and 
fraud." This could prove a promising avenue to address market power as one argument in 
economics revolves around the idea that codification of protections for producers, workers, 
consumers or the environment decreases efficiency and thus creates a smaller economic pie to 
divide up.  Wu and MacDonald (2015) suggest government enforcement of property rights or 
protections against fraud or misinformation actually facilitate efficiency, thereby implying that 
protections for farmers from exploitation of market power could offer wide benefits.   
Building new linkages in the food system 
Many of those fighting for better terms for contract growers and advocating for anti-trust 
enforcement and reform are simultaneously working to create new linkages in the food system.  
In North Carolina, RAFI-USA has helped farmers fight discriminatory lending practices, 
predatory contracts, and financial distress while also providing support for farmers to try 
alternative markets and production practices.  In the 1980s, for example, Tom Trantham was 
resigned to selling his beloved high-producing dairy cows before he worked with RAFI to 
implement a sustainable grazing plan that reduced his costs and allowed him to access new 
markets for on-farm bottled milk.16  In Missouri, farmers working through the Missouri Rural 
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Crisis Center waged battles against farm foreclosures caused by the 1980s Farm Crisis, fought 
the "chickenization" of the hog industry through a pork check-off vote, and also founded a 
producer cooperative, Patchwork Pork, to market naturally raised pork from members' farms.  In 
Kansas, Organization for Competitive Markets co-founder Mike Callicrate was an original 
member of the Pickett vs Tyson lawsuit but went on to develop Ranch Foods Direct, a company 
that includes cattle finishing, a mobile meat processing unit, a Colorado Springs retail outlet, and 
a processing/slaughter facility.17  Elizabeth Henderson of Peaceworks Organic Farm in New 
York raises organic foods and distributes through a community-supported agriculture farm, but 
also co-founded the Domestic Fair Trade Association and advocates for fair markets.  In 
Wisconsin, the Farmers Union created a food hub cooperative to market members' products to 
local stores, restaurants and schools.18  To push back against the centralization and 
commodification of knowledge in farm machinery, farmers organized themselves into Farm 
Hack, a global community of innovative farmers building and modifying farm implements – and 
then sharing their "hacks" with others (Carolan 2017). We include these examples to show how 
farmers embedded within the highly industrialized, capital-intensive systems struggle both to 
reshape commodity markets while also seeking to create alternatives that can transform food 
system relationships.  
Ongoing farmer/peasant struggles 
The concentration and industrialization of the agrifood system is not just a U.S. or 
Canadian experience.  Instead, smallholders around the world face many of the same constrained 
choices as North American farmers, with far fewer resource (Hendrickson et al. 2008).  Olivier 
de Schutter, former United Nations rapporteur on the right-to-food, has called for agroecological 
farming practices that would reduce the dependence of small-scale farmers on capital intensive 
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inputs and create local and regional food markets (de Schutter 2010a).  De Schutter went on to 
found the International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems that uses evidence-based 
research to inform policy debates on food systems around the world. In 2016 and 2017, this 
group released three monographs dealing with concentrated agrifood systems and impacts on 
health and ecology.19 However, the most widespread and potentially transformative movement is 
that oriented to food sovereignty, which seeks to move decisions over food – from production to 
consumption, from seeds to land, from market access to food safety – from the corporate realm 
into the hands of farmers and eaters around the world. 
Desmarais (2017, 3) says that "food sovereignty is best understood as a radical 
democratic project that, on the one hand, exposes the power dynamics within the current global 
food system, and on the other hand, cultivates new spaces (at all levels) for inclusive debate on a 
whole set of different issues related to food, agriculture and provisioning."  Originating in the 
myriad peasant and farmer groups that together make up La Via Campesina20, food sovereignty 
was the rejection of the dominant food security discourse that sought to maximize food 
production and enhance food access, all through a corporate neoliberal regime that focused on 
markets as a solution (Wittmann, Desmarais, and Wiebe 2010).  The definition of food 
sovereignty remains fluid, despite the best efforts of academics.  A Zimbabwean farmer, 
Elizabeth Mpofu, chastises those who don't understand that the movement is simultaneously 
within, against and beyond our current mode of power (neoliberal capitalism).   
"We are not trying to create the perfect definition, for a dictionary or for a history book. 
We are trying to build a movement to change the food system and the world. To build a 
powerful movement, you need to add more allies. And as you add more allies, you have 
more voices. More contributions. More issues to take into account. So your concept 
grows, it evolves, it broadens. To understand what Food Sovereignty is for La Via 
Campesina, yes, it is a vision of the food system we are fighting for, but, above all, it is 
a banner of struggle, and ever evolving banner of struggle."21 
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Wittmann, Desmarais, and Wiebe (2010 p 4) point to the power of food sovereignty as forcing us 
"to rethink our relationships with food, agriculture and the environment. But, perhaps the most 
revolutionary aspect …is that it forces us to rethink our relationships with one another." What 
this means in reality is that a farmer on an industrialized wheat farm in Saskatchewan, a member 
of the National Farmers Union of Canada, can find purpose and solidarity with a peasant farmer 
from Zimbabwe or an American corn producer on issues of agriculture and food trade and 
agroecological production.  The meeting and sharing of these disparate interests provide an 
alternative view of the potential for transformation of the food system.  As Desmarais (2017) 
says, food sovereignty is ultimately about the return to creating community, prioritizing 
relationships as best we can above the market.   
 
Conclusion: Contested Agrifood Transitions  
In this chapter we have sought to describe the current mode of power – the drive of 
agrifood firms to increase their own power relative to everyone else, even if it reduces wellbeing 
– that is at work in the global food system.  We have detailed the consolidated and concentrated 
markets that farmers face from buying inputs to selling their products, situations that exist across 
the globe from the U.S. to China. Farmers face constrained choices for everything from seeds 
and livestock genetics, to fertilizers and chemicals, to commodity processing.  Global 
behemoths, many with assistance from national governments, have come to dominate markets 
for seeds, pesticides, fertilizers, genetics, livestock and grain processing, food manufacturing, 
food retail and fast food.  Markets have globalized with decisions about what food to produce, 
where and how to produce it, who will produce it, and who will eat the resulting products 
centralized in the hands of a few decision-makers located in global production networks.  Such 
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constrained choices make it difficult for farmers to use practices that protect their ecosystems, 
that treat workers well, that strengthen their communities and that provide for economic 
development in their region.  They also make it difficult for everyone else to support these 
farmers in making their preferred choices, and steer us toward locking in existing power 
relations.  
However, as the number of agrifood firms decreases, and the negative impacts of 
capitalists’ power become more visible, new linkages between farmers and eaters, farmers of the 
North and farmers of the South, environmental groups, labor activists, small food businesses, 
animal welfare advocates and others are emerging.  Perhaps the best way to encapsulate the 
ongoing resistance to a globalized, industrialized agriculture is to examine proposed solutions to 
the looming problem of making sure that all of the nine billion people expected to be on earth by 
the mid-21st century will have enough of the right kind of food to eat, especially as we scrape the 
bottom of the barrel of "stored, concentrated energy -- fossil fuels, rock phosphate, potash, fossil 
water" and face higher energy and input costs, less freshwater and good soil, and increased 
adverse weather events (Kirschemann 2015). Two competing visions of agriculture have 
emerged as the path forward towards addressing this challenge: (1) food security through 
sustainable intensification, and (2) food sovereignty through agro-ecology (Constance et al. 
2014b; Levidow 2015).   
The food security discourse began in the 1940s when the United Nations Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) was created to establish global food security. Although the 
FAO embraced the scientific extensification and intensification of world agriculture to boost 
production, it also included the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which maintained that 
food was an essential right of life rather than a commodity.  The Cold War subverted FAO 
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multilateralism as the United States employed bilateral food aid to counter the spread of 
communism. The FAO vision of food as a right was replaced in 1986 when the World Bank 
redefined food security as the ability to buy food. In 1994 the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
institutionalized this market vision of food security whereby countries grow and trade agrifood 
products based on comparative advantage and people buy these foods instead of grow them. The 
WTO’s  Agreement on Agriculture in 2008 furthered this vision by defining the new agriculture 
as system of global entrepreneurial farmers employing sustainable intensification practices  
linked to agrifood transnational corporations in flexible arrangements governed by sustainability 
standards (Ingram et al.  2010; McMichael 2009).     
As noted in the above section, the food sovereignty movement posits a counter frame to 
food security approaches. Represented by La Via Campesina, this view challenges and denies the 
validity of the WTO-sanctioned food security framework based on free trade and corporate 
rights. Instead, La Via Campesina builds coalitions to create agrifood self-sufficiency through 
land reform, indigenous knowledge, and the regionalization of agrifood systems based on agro-
ecological principles (Desmarais et al. 2014; Fairbairn 2012; Rosset and Martinez-Torrez 2014; 
Wittman et al. 2010). These include the assumption that moderate and smaller scale agro-
ecological farming, situated and adapted in a particular place, is more resilient to climate shocks 
than industrial agriculture as well as the idea that domestic agrifood production is the better path 
to agrifood sustainability than global commodity chains (de Schutter 2010b).  
At their heart, these two contrasting perspectives represent alternative conceptions of 
modernity (Desmarias 2007; McMichael 2014). The food security discourse separates the social 
and physical sciences and casts traditional agriculturalists as primitive laggards whereas the food 
sovereignty frame values interdisciplinary approaches, honors indigenous knowledge, and 
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pursues social justice, which is the crucial fault line in agrifood studies (Allen 2008; Rivera-
Ferre 2012). Food security proceeds from a land commodification perspective, which assumes 
the problem of food supply can be solved through a high-tech repackaging of the adoption and 
diffusion approaches of the productivist paradigm that has underlined the global consolidation of 
the agrifood system we described in our results. In contrast, food sovereignty views land through 
a multifunctional lens, employing a full-cost accounting approach that internalizes the 
unsustainable externalities. It embraces a rights-based rather than market-centered framework 
where rights are defined in collective rather than individual terms (McMichael 2014). The food 
sovereignty perspective proposes a repossession of the land in the face of the continuing 
enclosures based on accumulation through dispossession. The intellectual property rights/copy 
right framework advanced by the WTO is countered by a copy-left and open-source framework 
advanced by La Via Campesina. The battle between La Via Campesina and the GMO seed TNCs 
over seed sovereignty is a crucial example of the conflicting paradigms (Kloppenburg 2010).  
The tension between the food security and the food sovereignty visions aligns directly 
with the two proposed transition paths to a sustainable global agrifood system. The food security 
path is based on neo-productivist solutions that have resulted in the concentrated agrifood system 
we described, diffused globally from Europe and North America around the world, as the new 
paradigm to meet the challenge of feeding the world with sustainable intensification (Almas and 
Campbell 2012; Levidow 2015; Marsden 2013). The food sovereignty path is based on 
agroecology and a social justice framework. The food security path is patterned on utilitarian 
assumptions about agrifood science and rurality. The greater good for the most people outweighs 
the negative impacts on the few. The agroecology path employs rights-based rhetoric grounded 
in a social justice agenda (Thompson 2010). The food security path includes incremental, green 
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reforms to the existing system, while the food sovereignty path pushes for transformative change 
to the system (Constance et al. 2014b; Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck 2011). With little evidence, 
the neo-productivists promise their hi-tech green solution can feed the world, while the low-tech 
agroecology approach cannot.  The agroecologists warn that sustainable intensification is an 
oxymoron at least, and more probably a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing.’  
In the end, it is likely that the industrialized agrifood system – even dressed up through 
sustainable intensification – will have to change if we want to continue to feed human society in 
ways that acknowledge our indisputable connection with, and impact on, Earth's ecosystem.  The 
question is, can those visionary farmers and allies work fast enough for us all? Will the capitalist 
mode of power have sabotaged more democratic, socially just and ecologically sustainable 
alternatives to the extent that we will lack the resilience needed to build a better food system?  
 
1 Based on USDA Natural Resource Conservation Services studies. See 
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/ne/newsroom/releases/?cid=NRCSEPRD386010 
2 See blog posts from the University of Missouri Integrated Pest Management Program at 
https://ipm.missouri.edu/IPCM/2017/7/Ag_Industry_Do_we_have_a_problem_yet/.  
3 See http://www.npr.org/2017/06/14/532879755/a-pesticide-a-pigweed-and-a-farmers-murder. 
4 ETC Group (2013) notes BASF is not a strong contender in the seed market itself, but maintains a great deal of 
seed research and is in partnership with the other five firms in new ventures. 
5 https://agfundernews.com/big-ag-turns-digital-ag-growth-ex-senior-dupont-exec-joins-farmers-edge-board.html 
6 See Successful Farming's Pork Powerhouses: Accessed on July 31, 2017 at http://www.agriculture.com/pdf/pork-
powerhouses-2016.  
7 "A production contract usually specifies in detail the production inputs to be supplied by the contractor, the quality 
and quantity of the particular commodity involved, the production practices to be used, and the manner in which 
compensation is to be paid to the producer." ((Kunkel and Peterson 2015)  Forward contracting is an agreement to 
purchase livestock in advance of slaughter, where the base price is established by reference to prices on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange. See https://www.ams.usda.gov/market-news/livestock-poultry-and-grain-cattle-terms.  
8 Annual report on the pork industry by Successful Farming. Available http://www.agriculture.com/livestock/pork-
powerhouses/pork-powerhouses-2016-glut-of-pigs. 
9 Statement by Wenonah Hauter, Executive Director of Food and Water Watch on June 26, 2017 regarding 
Amazon's acquisition of Whole Foods. https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/news/amazon%E2%80%99s-
acquisition-whole-foods-higher-prices-fewer-choices-consumers-and-more-profits  
10 CNBC : https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/16/amazon-whole-foods-pair-up-signals-power-shift-for-the-food-
industry.html  
11 https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/food-expenditures/interactive-chart-food-expenditures/  
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12 Bloomberg Government Disclosure, "US Foods Holding Corp at Deutsche Bank Global Consumer Conference – 
Final." June 14, 2017. 
13 More information on these workshops, including full transcripts of each workshop, can be found at 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/events/public-workshops-agriculture-and-antitrust-enforcement-issues-our-21st-century-
economy-10.  
14 See http://www.dominalaw.com/documents/Domina-Speech-Annual-OCM-Meeting-8-09.pdf.  
15 USDA announces Farmer Fair Practices Rule: https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2016/12/14/usda-
announces-farmer-fair-practices-rules-clarifications-industry  
16 See more about Tom Trantham's farm at http://www.sare.org/Learning-Center/Multimedia/Videos-from-the-
Field/Sustainable-12-Aprils-Dairy-Grazing.  
17 See more at http://ranchfoodsdirect.com/.  
18 See more at http://www.wifoodhub.com/about-wfhc/.  
19 See http://www.ipes-food.org/ for more information.  In 2016, the group released "Unravelling the Food-Health 
Nexus" and "From Uniformity to Diversity", and in 2017 "Too Big to Feed". One author, Howard, is a member of 
this group. 
20 La Via Campesina is an international peasants movement representing over 200 million peasant farmers in 79 
countries belonging to 164 different organizations.  Their 2017 declaration says "We, the peasants, rural workers, 
landless, indigenous peoples, pastoralists, artisanal fisherfolk, rural women and other peoples who work in the 
countryside around the world, declare that we feed our people and build the movement to change the world 
(emphasis in original)." https://viacampesina.org/en/  
21 https://www.iss.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/iss/Documents/Conference_presentations/ElizabethMpofu-ISS-
25_January_2014.pdf  
  
44 
 
 
References  
Allen, Patricia. 2008. " Mining for justice in the food system: perceptions, practices, and 
possibilities." Agriculture and Human Values 25:157-161. 
Almås, Reidar, and Hugh Campbell. 2012. “Reframing Policy Regimes and the Future 
Resilience of Global Agriculture.” In Rethinking Agricultural Policy Regimes: Food 
Security, Climate Change and the Future Resilience of Global Agriculture, edited by Hugh 
Campbell and Reidar Almas, 285–300. doi:10.1108/S1057-1922(2012)0000018015. 
Adjemian, Michael K., B. Wade Brorsen, Tina L Saitone, and Richard J Sexton. 2016. “Thinning 
Markets in U.S. Agriculture What Are the Implications for Producers and Processors?” 
Washington, D.C.: USDA Economic Research Service.  
Aziz, Tariq, M. Aamer Maqsood, Shamsa Kanwal, Shahid Hussain, H. R. Ahmad, and M. Sabir. 
2015. “Fertilizers and Environment: Issues and Challenges.” In Crop Production and 
Global Environmental Issues, edited by Khalid ehman Hakeem, 575–98. Cham: Springer 
International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-23162-4_21. 
Bartlett, Donald, and James Steele. 2008. “Monsanto’s Harvest of Fear.” Vanity Fair, April. 
Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2012. “The Asymptotes of Power.” Real-World 
Economics Review 60 (2): 18–53. 
Bonanno, Alessandro. 2009. “Sociology of Agriculture and Food Beginning and Maturity: The 
Contribution of the Missouri School (1976–1994).” Southern Rural Sociology 24 (2): 29–
47. 
Breimyer, Harold F. 1965. Individual Freedom and the Economic Organization of Agriculture. 
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. 
Burger, Ludwig. 2016. “Digital Farming Could Spell Shake-up for Crop Chemicals Sector.” 
Reuters, May 4. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-farming-digital-idUSKCN0XV0KP. 
Carolan, Michael. 2017. “Publicising Food: Big Data, Precision Agriculture, and Co-
Experimental Techniques of Addition.” Sociologia Ruralis 57 (2): 135–54. 
doi:10.1111/soru.12120. 
Carstensen, Peter C. 2008. “ Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive 
Effects of Discrimination among Suppliers.” Antitrust Bulletin 53 (20): 271–331. 
———. Ioannis Lianos, Claudio Lombardi, and James M. MacDonald. 2016. “Competition Law 
45 
 
and Policy and the Food Value Chain.” Concurrences Competition Law Review 1 (1–35). 
http://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-1-2016/on-topic/competition-law-and-
policy-and-the-food-value-chain. 
Coleman-Jensen, Alisha, Matthew P. Rabbitt, Christain A. Gregory, and Anita Singh. 2016. 
“Household Food Security in the United States in 2015.” Washington, D.C.: USDA 
Economic Research Service.  
Connor, John, Richard Rogers, Bruce Marion and Willard Mueller. 1984. The Food 
Manufacturing Industries: Structure, Strategies, Performance and Policies. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books. 
Constance, Douglas H. 2008. “The Southern Model of Broiler Production and Its Global 
Implications.” Culture and Agriculture 30(1):17-31. 
———. 2009. “AFHVS Presidential Address - The Four Questions in Agrifood Studies: A View 
from the Bus.” Agriculture and Human Values 26 (1): 3–14. doi:10.1007/s10460-008-
9187-0. 
Constance, Douglas H., Mary Hendrickson, Phillip H. Howard, and William D. Heffernan. 
2014a. “Economic Concentration in the Agrifood System: Impacts on Rural Communities 
and Emerging Responses.” In Rural America in a Globalizing World: Problems and 
Prospects for the 2010s, edited by Connor Bailey, Leif Jensen, and Elizabeth Ransom, 16–
35. Morgantown WV: West Virginia University Press. 
Constance, Douglas H., William H. Friedland, Marie-Christine Renard, and Marta Rivera-Ferre. 
2014b. “The Discourse on Alternative Agrifood Movements.” In Alternative Agrifood 
Movements: Patterns of Convergence and Divergence, edited by Douglas H. Constance, 
Marie-Christine Renard, and Marta Rivera-Ferre, 3-46.  Bingley, UK: Emerald Group 
Publishing Ltd.  
Constance, Douglas H., Francisco Martinez and Gilberto Aboites. 2010. "The globalization of 
the poultry industry: Tyson Foods and Pilgrim's Pride in Mexico." Pp. 59-75 in From 
Community to Consumption: New and Classical Themes in Rural Sociological Research 
edited by Alessandro Bonanno, Hans Bakker, Raymond Jussaume, Yoshio Kawamura, 
Mark Shucksmith. Bingley UK: Emerald Group Publishing. 
Cotterill, Ronald W. 2010. “Antitrust Economic Analysis in Food Marketing Channels: A Global 
Perspective.” Agricultural Economics 41 (November): 83–91. doi:10.1111/j.1574-
46 
 
0862.2010.00491.x. 
Crespi, John M., Tina L. Saitone, and Richard J. Sexton. 2012. “Competition in U.S. Farm 
Product Markets: Do Long-Run Incentives Trump Short-Run Market Power?” Applied 
Economic Perspectives and Policy 34 (4): 669–95. doi:10.1093/aepp/pps045. 
Degen, Ronald Jean and K. Matthew Wong. 2012. "An Examination of the Resource-Based 
Horizontal Acquisition Strategy of JBS -- the Biggest Meat Packer in the World." 
Proceedings of the New York State Economics Association. Vol 5: 37-46. 
DeLind, Laura B. 2011. “Are Local Food and the Local Food Movement Taking Us Where We 
Want to Go? Or Are We Hitching Our Wagons to the Wrong Stars?” Agriculture and 
Human Values 28 (2): 273–83. doi:10.1007/s10460-010-9263-0. 
De Schutter, O. 2010a. "Addressing Concentration in Food Supply Chains: The Role of 
Competition Law in Tackling the Abuse of Buyer Power." Report of the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food. 
http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/20101201_briefing-note-
03_en.pdf 
———. 2010b. Agribusiness and the right to food.” Report to the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food to the Human Rights Council 
http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/20100305_a-hrc-13-
33_agribusiness_en.pdf    
Desmarias, Annette. 2007. La Via Campesina: Globalization and the Power of Peasants. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
———. 2017. "The power and potential of food sovereignty: an agenda for social 
transformation." Keynote Address to XXVII Congress of the European Society for Rural 
Sociology. Krakow, Poland. July. 
Desmarias, Annette, A. Marta G. Rivera-Ferre, and Beatriz Gasco. 2014. "Building Alliances 
for Food Sovereignty: La Vía Campesina, NGOs, and Social Movements." Pp. 89-110 
Alternative Agrifood Movements: Patterns of Convergence and Divergence, Research 
in Rural Sociology and Development, Volume 21 edited by Douglas H. 
Constance , Marie-Christine Renard , Marta G. Rivera-Ferre. Bingley, UK: Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited. 
Eller, Donnelle. 2014. “Erosion Estimated to Cost Iowa $1 Billion in Yield.” Des Moines 
47 
 
Register, May 3. 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/money/agriculture/2014/05/03/erosion-estimated-
cost-iowa-billion-yield/8682651/. 
ETC Group. 2013. “Putting the Cartel before the Horse ... and Farm, Seeds, Soil, Peasants, Etc.” 
Communiqué, no. 111: 40. 
FAO. 2009.  How to Feed the World in 2050. Rome, Italy. Retrieved from 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/expert_paper/How_to_Feed_the_World_i
n_2050.pdf 
———. 2015. “Status and Trends of Animal Genetic Resources.” In The Second Report on the 
State of the World’s Animal Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 25–42. Rome: 
FAO. http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4787e.pdf. 
Fairbairn, Madeleine. 2012. " Framing transformation: the counter-hegemonic potential of food 
sovereignty in the US context." Agriculture and Human Values 29(2):217-230. 
Farm Futures. 2017. “GIPSA Rule Implementation Delayed, Comment Period Extended,” 
February 8. http://www.farmfutures.com/farm-policy/gipsa-rule-implementation-delayed-
comment-period-extended. 
Foer, Albert A. 2016. “Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position (ASBP): What Can We Learn 
from Our Trading Partners?” Washington, D.C.: American Antitrust Institute.  
Food and Water Watch; 2013.  "Grocery Goliaths: How Food Monopolies Impact Consumers." 
Washington, D.C.  December. Available at 
https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/sites/default/files/Grocery%20Goliaths%20Report%20
Dec%202013.pdf.  
Foster, John Bellamy, and Fred Magdoff. 2000. “Liebig, Marx and the Depletion of Soil 
Fertility: Relevance for Today’s Agriculture.” In Hungry for Profit: The Agribusiness 
Threat to Farmers, Food and Environment, edited by John Bellamy Foster, Fred Magdoff, 
and Frederick H. Buttel, 43–60. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Fuglie, Keith O., Paul W. Heisey, John L. King, Carl E. Pray, Kelly Day-Rubenstein, David 
Schimmelpfennig, Sun Ling Wang, and Rupa Karmarkar-Deshmukh. 2011. "Research 
Investments and Market Structure in the Food Processing, Agricultural Input, and Biofuel 
Industries Worldwide." Washington, D.C.: USDA Economic Research Service.  
48 
 
Gardner, Brian. 2009. Global Food Futures: Feeding the World in 2050. London and New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic.  
GIPSA. 2016. “Packers and Stockyards Program Annual Report.” Washington D.C.: USDA. 
https://www.gipsa.usda.gov/psp/publication/ar/2016_psp_annual_report.pdf. 
Goldschmidt, Walter. 1978. As You Sow:Three Studies in the Social Consequences of 
Agribusiness. Montclair, NJ: Allenheld, Osmun and Co. Publishers Inc. 
Greene, Joel L. 2016. “USDA’s ‘GIPSA Rule’ on Livestock and Poultry Marketing Practices.” 
R41673. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.  
Gullickson, Gil. 2017. “Why Bayer’s Buyout of Monsanto Will Likely Proceed.” Successful 
Farming. March 17. http://www.agriculture.com/news/crops/why-bayer-s-buyout-of-
monsanto-will-likely-proceed. 
Gura, Susanne. 2007. “Livestock Genetics Companies Concentration and Proprietary Strategies 
of an Emerging Power in the Global Food Economy.” Ober-Ramstadt, Germany. 
http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/4/1266/. 
Harris, Wylie. 2004. “The Power of Concentration: Local Ruminations on Global Ruination.” 
The Touchstone. 
https://www.iatp.org/files/Power_of_Concentration_Local_Ruminations_on_Gl.htm. 
Heffernan, William D. 1984. “Constraints in the Poultry Industry.” Pp. 237-260 in Research in 
Rural Sociology and Development: Vol 1., edited by H. Schwarzweller. Greenwich: JAI 
Press.  
———. 2000. “Concentration of Ownership in Agriculture.” Pp. 61-76 in Hungry for Profit: The 
Agribusiness Threat to Farmers, Food, and the Environment, edited by F. Magdoff, J.B. 
Foster and F.H. Buttel. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Heffernan, William D., Mary Hendrickson, and Robert Gronski. 1999. “Consolidation in the 
Food and Agriculture System.” Report to the National Farmers Union, Washington D.C. 
Hendrickson, Mary, William D. Heffernan, Philip H. Howard, and Judith B. Heffernan. 2001. 
“Consolidation in Food  Retailing and Dairy.” British Food Journal 103 (10): 715–28. 
Hendrickson, Mary K., Harvey James, and William D. Heffernan. 2013. “Vertical Integration 
and Concentration in US Agriculture.” In Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics, 
edited by Paul B. Thompson and David M. Kaplan, 1–10. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. 
doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6167-4_216-1. 
49 
 
Hendrickson, Mary K. 2015. “Resilience in a Concentrated and Consolidated Food System.” 
Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences 5 (3): 418–31. doi:10.1007/s13412-015-
0292-2. 
Hendrickson, Mary K, and Harvey S James. 2005. “The Ethics of Constrained Choice: How the 
Industrialization of Agriculture Impacts Farming and Farmer Behavior.” Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18 (3). Springer: 269–91. 
Hendrickson, Mary, John Wilkinson, William D. Heffernan, and Robert Gronski. 2008. “The 
Global Food System and Nodes of Power.” SSRN Electronic Journal. 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1337273. 
Howard, Philip H. 2009. “Visualizing Food System Concentration and Consolidation.” Southern 
Rural Sociology 24 (2): 87–110.  
Howard, Philip H. 2009. “Visualizing Consolidation in the Global Seed Industry: 1996–2008.” 
Sustainability 1 (4): 1266–87. doi:10.3390/su1041266. 
———. 2015. “Intellectual Property and Consolidation in the Seed Industry.” Crop Science 55 
(6): 2489. doi:10.2135/cropsci2014.09.0669. 
———. 2016a. Concentration and Power in the Food System: Who Controls What We Eat? 
New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic. 
———. 2016b. Decoding Diversity in the Food System: Wheat and Bread in North 
America. Agriculture and Human Values, 33(4): 953-960. 
———. 2017. “Consolidation in Global Meat Processing.” Philhoward.net, June 21. 
https://philhoward.net/2017/06/21/consolidation-in-global-meat-processing/. 
Ingram, Paul, Lori Qingyuan Yue, and Hayagreeva Rao. 2010. “Trouble in Store: Probes, 
Protests, and Store Openings by Wal-Mart, 1998–2007.” American Journal of Sociology 
116 (1): 53–92. 
Jaffee, Daniel, and Philip H. Howard. 2010. “Corporate Cooptation of Organic and Fair Trade 
Standards.” Agriculture and Human Values 27 (4): 387–99. 
James Jr, Harvey S, Mary K Hendrickson, and Philip H Howard. 2013. “Networks, Power and 
Dependency in the Agrifood Industry.” In The Ethics and Economics of Agrifood 
Competition, edited by Harvey S. James, 20:99–126. The International Library of 
Environmental, Agricultural and Food Ethics. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. 
doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6274-9. 
50 
 
James Jr, Harvey S, and Mary K Hendrickson. 2008. “Perceived Economic Pressures and Farmer 
Ethics.” Agricultural Economics 38 (3). Wiley Online Library: 349–61. 
King, Christine A .2008. "Community resilience and contemporary agri-ecological systems: 
Reconnecting people and food, and people with people." Systems Research and Behavioral 
Science 25:111-124 
Kirschenmann, Frederick L. 2015. "From Soil to Sustainability." Rootstalk: A Prairie Journal of 
Culture, Science and the Arts 2(1): 49-55.  
Kloppenburg, Jack. 2010. “Impeding Dispossession, Enabling Repossession: Biological Open 
Source and the Recovery of Seed Sovereignty.” Journal of Agrarian Change 10 (3): 367–
88. doi:10.1111/j.1471-0366.2010.00275.x. 
Kowitt, B Y Beth. 2017. “The Deal That Made an Industry Shudder.” Fortune. June 22. 
Kunkel, Philip L., and Jeffrey A. Peterson. 2015. “Agricultural Production Contracts.” 
University of Minnesota Extension. Available at: 
https://www.extension.umn.edu/agriculture/business/taxation/farm-legal-series/agricultural-
production-contracts/docs/agricultural-production-contracts.pdf. 
Lamine, Claire. 2015. “Sustainability and Resilience in Agrifood Systems: Reconnecting 
Agriculture, Food and the Environment.” Sociologia Ruralis 55 (1): 41–61. 
doi:10.1111/soru.12061. 
Leonard, Christopher. 2014. The Meat Racket. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Legun, Katharine, and Michael M. Bell. 2016. “The Second Middle: Conducers and the Agrifood 
Economy.” Journal of Rural Studies 48. Elsevier Ltd: 104–14. 
doi:10.1016/j.jrurstud.2016.10.004. 
Levidow, Les. 2015.  "European Transitions Towards a Corporate-Environmental Food Regime: 
Agroecological Incorporation or Contestation?" Journal of Rural Studies 40:76-89. 
Lianos, Ioannis, Dmitry Katalevsky, and Alexey Ivanov. 2016. “The Global Seed Market, 
Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: Untying the Gordian Knot.” 
Concurrences Competition Law Review II. 
Lobao, Linda. 1990. Locality and Inequality: Farm Structure, Industry Structure, and 
Socioeconomic Conditions. Albany, NY: The State University of New York Press. 
Lobao, Linda, and Curtis W Stofferahn. 2007. “The Community Effects of Industrialized 
Farming: Social Science Research and Challenges to Corporate Farming Laws.” Agriculture 
51 
 
and Human Values 25 (2): 219–40. doi:10.1007/s10460-007-9107-8. 
Lowder, Sarah K., Jakob Skoet, and Terri Raney. 2016. “The Number, Size, and Distribution of 
Farms, Smallholder Farms, and Family Farms Worldwide.” World Development 87: 16–29. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.041. 
Lyson, Thomas A. 2004. Civic Agriculture. Lebanon, NH: Tufts University Press. 
Lyson, Thomas A, George W Stevenson, and Rick Welsh. 2008. Food and the Mid-Level Farm. 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
MacDonald, James M. 2016. “Concentration, Contracting, and Competition Policy in U.S. 
Agribusiness.” Concurrences Competition Law Review I.: 3–9. 
Marsden, Terry. 2012. “Towards a Real Sustainable Agri-Food Security and Food Policy: 
Beyond the Ecological Fallacies?” The Political Quarterly 83 (1): 139–45. 
McMichael, Philip. 2009. "A Food Regime Genealogy." The Journal of Peasant Studies, 36, 
139-169. 
McMichael, Philip. 2014. "Historicizing food sovereignty." Journal of Peasant Studies 41(6): 
933. 
Montgomery, David R. 2012. Dirt: The Erosion of Civilization. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
Mooney, Pat. 2017. “Agricultural Mega-Mergers – History Lessons.” European Seed 4 (2). 
http://european-seed.com/agricultural-mega-mergers-history-lessons/. 
Moss, Diana. 2016. “Consolidation in Agriculture and Food: Challenges for Competition 
Enforcement.” Concurrences Competition Law Review2 1: 10–14. 
Mount, Phil. 2012. “Growing Local Food: Scale and Local Food Systems Governance.” 
Agriculture and Human Values 29 (1): 107–21. doi:10.1007/s10460-011-9331-0. 
Murphy, Sophia, David Burch, and Jennifer Clapp. 2012. “Cereal Secrets: The World’s Largest 
Grain Traders and Global Agriculture.” Oxfam International. August. 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rr-cereal-secrets-grain-traders-
agriculture-30082012-en.pdf. 
Murray, Alan. 2016. “Why Bayer Wants Monsanto.” Fortune, May 19. 
http://fortune.com/2016/05/19/bayer-monsanto-merger-approach-brainstorm/. 
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
52 
 
Oya, Carlos. 2013. “The Land Rush and Classic Agrarian Questions of Capital and Labour: A 
Systematic Scoping Review of the Socioeconomic Impact of Land Grabs in Africa.” Third 
World Quarterly 34 (9): 1532–57. doi:10.1080/01436597.2013.843855. 
Peck, Alison. 2006. "State Regulation of Production Contracts." Available from the National 
Law Center, University of Arkansas. Available at: http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/assets/articles/peck_contractregulation.pdf. 
Plume, Kari. 2014. “High-Tech U.S. Farm Machines Harvest Big Data, Reap Privacy Worries.” 
Reuters, April 9. http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-farming-data-
idUSL2N0N11U720140409. 
Polansek, Tom, and Julie Zhu. 2017. “China’s WH Group Targets Beef and Poultry Assets in 
U.S. and Europe.” Reuters, June 6. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-smithfield-m-a-
idUSKBN18Z29Y. 
Posey, Kirby G. 2016. “Household Income 2015: American Community Survey Briefs.” 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/acsbr15-
02.pdf. 
Rivera-Ferre, Marta G.  2012. "Framing of agri-food research affects of the analysis of food 
security: The critical role of the social sciences." International Journal of Sociology of 
Agriculture and Food, 19(2):162– 175.  
Roesch-McNally, Gabrielle E., Andrea D. Basche, J.G. Arbuckle, John C. Tyndall, Fernando E. 
Miguez, Troy Bowman, and Rebecca Clay. 2017. “The Trouble with Cover Crops: Farmers’ 
Experiences with Overcoming Barriers to Adoption.” Renewable Agriculture and Food 
Systems, March, 1–12. doi:10.1017/S1742170517000096. 
Rosset, Peter M., and María Elena Martínez-Torres. 2014. "Food Sovereignty and Agroecology 
in the Convergence of Rural Social Movements." Pp 137-157 in  Alternative Agrifood 
Movements: Patterns of Convergence and Divergence edited by Douglas H. Constance , 
Marie-Christine Renard , Marta G. Rivera-Ferre. Bingley, UK:Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited. 
Sinclair, Katrina, Allan Curtis, Emily Mendham, and Michael Mitchell. 2014. “Can Resilience 
Thinking Provide Useful Insights for Those Examining Efforts to Transform Contemporary 
Agriculture?” Agriculture and Human Values 31 (3): 371–84. doi:10.1007/s10460-014-
9488-4. 
53 
 
Sito, Peggy. 2016. “Chinese Pork Giant WH Group May Eye Major Acquisitions by End of 
2017.” South China Morning Post, November 20. 
http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/2047719/chinese-pork-giant-wh-group-
will-eye-major-acquisitions-end-2017. 
Stuart, Diana. 2009. “Constrained Choice and Ethical Dilemmas in Land Management: 
Environmental Quality and Food Safety in California Agriculture.” Journal of Agricultural 
and Environmental Ethics 22 (1): 53–71. doi:10.1007/s10806-008-9129-2. 
Stuart, Diana, and Rebecca L. Schewe. 2016. “Constrained Choice and Climate Change 
Mitigation in US Agriculture: Structural Barriers to a Climate Change Ethic.” Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 29 (3): 369–85. doi:10.1007/s10806-016-9605-z. 
Taylor, C. Robert. 2007. “Legal and Economic Issues with the Courts’ Rulings in Pickett v. 
Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., a Buyer Power Case.” Washington, D.C.: American Antitrust 
Institute. 
Taylor, C. Robert, and Diana Moss. 2013. “The Fertilizer Oligopoly: The Case for Global 
Antitrust Enforcement.” Washington, D.C.: American Antitrust Institute. 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/FertilizerMonograph.pdf. 
Thompson, Paul. 2010. The Ethics of Intensification: Agricultural Development and Social 
Change. New York: Springer. 
U.S. Departments of Justice and Agriculture. 2010. Public Workshops Exploring Competition 
Issues in Agriculture. Ankeny, IA. March 12. Available at: 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/12/20/iowa-agworkshop-
transcript.pdf 
U.S. Department of Justice. 2012. “Competition and Agriculture: Voices from the Workshops on 
Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement in Our 21st Century Economy and Thoughts on the 
Way Forward,” no. May: 1–24. 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2012/05/16/283291.pdf. 
UNCTAD. 2006. “Tracking the Trend towards Market Concentration: The Case of the 
Agricultural Input Industry.” Geneva, Switzerland. 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditccom200516_en.pdf. 
USDA. 2015a. “Census of Agriculture Highlights: Family Farms.” 
https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Highlights/NASS 
54 
 
Family Farmer/Family_Farms_Highlights.pdf. 
———. 2015b. “Principal Farm Operator Household Finances, by ERS Farm Typology.” 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/DataFiles/48870/table02.xls?v=42704. 
Wilkinson, John. 2006. “Network Theories and Political Economy: From Attrition to 
Convergence?  .” Research in Rural Sociology and Development 12: 27. 
Wittmann, Hannah, Annette Aurélie Desmarais, and Nettie Wiebe. 2010. “The Origins & 
Potential of Food Sovereignty.” In Food Sovereingty - Reconnecting Food, Nature & 
Community, edited by Annette Desmarais, Nettie Wiebe, and Hannah Wittman. Oxford, 
UK. https://foodfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Food-Sovereignty_INTRO_Origins-
Potential-of-Food-Sov.pdf. 
Wu, S. Y., and J MacDonald. 2015. “Economics of Agricultural Contract Grower Protection 
Legislation.” CHOICES Magazine. 
 
View publication stats
